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An exact analysis of stable allocation
Donald E. Knuth
Computer Science Department, Stanford University
Abstract. Shapley and Scarf [8] introduced a notion of stable allocation between traders
and indivisible goods, when each trader has rank-ordered each of the goods. The purpose
of this note is to prove that the distribution of ranks after allocation is the same as the
distribution of search distances in uniform hashing, when the rank-orderings are indepen-
dent and uniformly random. Therefore the average sum of final ranks is just (n+1)Hn−n,
and the standard deviation is O(n). The proof involves a family of interesting one-to-one
correspondences between permutations of a special kind.
0. Introduction. Suppose n traders have n indivisible goods to trade, and each trader k has
ranked the goods of all traders (including himself) as a permutation
pk = pk1 pk2 . . . pkn
of {1, 2, . . . , n}. If i precedes j in this list, we write “i > j (k)” and say that k prefers i to j. An
allocation of goods to traders is a permutation g1 . . . gn of {1, . . . , n} such that trader k gets gk.
Shapley and Scarf [8] defined what they called a “core allocation” g, which is stable in the following
sense: If C is any coalition of traders (a nonempty subset), and if h is any allocation of the goods
of C to the members of C, then
hk ≥ gk (k) for all k ∈ C =⇒ hk = gk for all k ∈ C. (∗)
For example, suppose n = 3 and the preference rankings are
p1 = 213 ,
p2 = 312 ,
p3 = 231 .
Then just three of the six possible allocations satisfy (∗) when C is the full set {1, 2, 3}, namely
2 1 3, 2 3 1, and 1 3 2. But 2 1 3 is unstable because traders 2 and 3 can both improve their lot by
swapping goods between themselves. Similarly, 2 3 1 is unstable, but it is not quite as bad: If the
coalition {2, 3} exchanges goods, trader 3 is happier than he was before, while 2 is no worse off.
The remaining allocation, 1 3 2, is stable.
It is not immediately obvious that a stable allocation always exists, for all n!n possible ranking
sequences. But Shapley and Scarf presented an algorithm by David Gale that always finds one.
In fact, there is always exactly one stable allocation. Gale’s procedure is similar to the famous
Gale-Shapley algorithm for stable marriage [2,4], but it incorporates a new twist.
Alan Frieze and Boris Pittel [1] recently analyzed Gale’s algorithm and discovered some re-
markable simplifications in the course of their study. One of the main purposes of the present note
is to exhibit some underlying combinatorial structure that accounts for the surprising phenomena
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they discovered. Frieze and Pittel proved, among other things, that the total sum of ranks in
the stable allocation g (i.e., the sum r1 + · · · + rn, where gk = pkrk) is between (
1
2
− ǫ)n lnn and
(1+ǫ)n lnn with high probability as n→∞, assuming that the preferences pk are independent and
uniformly random. We will deduce the exact distribution of r1+ · · ·+rn, showing in particular that
its mean value is (n + 1)Hn − n, and in fact we will see that the joint distribution of the multiset
{r1, . . . , rn} has a particularly simple form.
1. Uniform hashing. First let’s consider a simpler problem, namely to find an allocation g that
satisfies (∗) when C is the full set {1, . . . , n} but not necessarily for any other C. Such an allocation
is locally optimal, in the sense that no trader can improve his selection unless some other trader
loses ground. It’s easy to achieve such an allocation by simply letting gk be the first item of list pk
that is not in {g1, . . . , gk−1}, for k = 1, . . . , n.
This trivial allocation algorithm, “first-come first-served,” is precisely the method of uniform
hashing that arises in the study of information retrieval [5], when the preference lists (called “hash
sequences” in that context) are randomly chosen. The analysis of uniform hashing is particularly
simple, and we will see below that stable allocation can be reduced to the same analysis.
A more general way to obtain a locally optimal allocation is to let π be any permutation of
{1, . . . , n}, and then to let gpi(k) be the first item of ppi(k) that is not in {gpi(1) . . . gpi(k−1)}, for
k = 1, . . . , n. The permutation π gives top priority to trader π(1), then to π(2), and so on. Indeed,
every allocation that satisfies (∗) for C = {1, . . . , n} will be found by this method, for some π.
The reason is that we must have gk = pk1 for some k, in any locally optimum g, because the
mapping from k to pk1 for all k always contains a cycle; any such cycle can be used to improve
an allocation in which no trader has his first choice. Let π(1) be any value of k with gk = pk1.
Remove k from all preference lists and apply the same reasoning recursively to the remaining n− 1
traders. This defines a permutation π(1)π(2) . . . π(n) such that gpi(k) is the favorite of trader π(k)
in {1, . . . , n} \ {gpi(1), . . . , gpi(k−1)}.
Since every locally optimum allocation is obtained in this way using some π, the stable alloca-
tion must itself result from some π. And when the preference lists are random, any π behaves like
any other. Thus we might expect that stable allocation statistics are essentially identical to the
statistics of uniform hashing. This, in fact, is true, but we must be careful to make the argument
rigorous.
2. An algorithm. Let’s now consider a simple algorithm that computes the stable allocation,
given any sequence of preference rankings p1 . . . pn. The following procedure is a sequential variant
of Gale’s parallel method, analogous to the McVitie-Wilson version [7] of Gale and Shapley’s original
stable marriage algorithm. The basic idea is to look for cycles among the traders’ best choices, and
to put such cycles into the allocation whenever they are found.
A1. [Initialize.] Set (q1, . . . , qn)← (−1, . . . ,−1), (r1, . . . , rn)← (0, . . . , 0), (g1, . . . , gn)←
(0, . . . , 0), and t ← 0. (During this algorithm, t will be a trader who makes proposals
to other traders, or zero when a new trader needs to enter the picture. Variable qk will
be the number of a trader who currently wants trader k’s goods, or qk = 0 if trader k
has expressed interest in somebody else’s wares but nobody has reciprocated; qk = −1 if
trader k has not yet entered. Variable rk is the position of trader k in his list, the number
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of proposals he has made. Variable gk is trader k’s allocation, or 0 if no allocation has yet
been made.)
A2. [Introduce a new trader.] (At this point t = 0, and gk = 0 iff qk = −1. The traders
with gk > 0 have been assigned a permutation of their goods.) If all gk are nonzero, the
algorithm terminates. Otherwise, set t to some k with gk = 0, and set qt ← 0.
A3. [Propose.] Increase rt by 1, then set s = ptrt . If gs > 0, repeat this step. (Trader t
has expressed interest in his best remaining choice, s.)
A4. [Is s spoken for?] If qs ≥ 0, go to step A5. Otherwise set qs ← t and t ← s, then
return to A3.
A5. [Remove a cycle.] (There is now a cycle s = s1 → s2 → · · · → sm = s, where sj+1
is the best remaining choice of sj . This cycle must be part of any stable allocation, so
we incorporate it into g.) Set t ← qs; then repeatedly set gs ← psrs and s ← psrs until
finding gs > 0. If t = 0, return to A2, otherwise go to A3.
In step A3 there is always a path
0 = t0 → t1 → t2 → · · · → tm = t
connecting all traders k such that gk = 0 and qk ≥ 0. Trader t1 entered in step A2, and tj+1 is the
best remaining choice of tj , for 1 ≤ j < m; also qtj = tj−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. These invariant relations
justify the parenthesized assertions within the algorithm.
The final allocation g1 . . . gn is stable. For if hk ≤ gk (k) for all hk in some coalition C, and if
some hk < gk (k), then hk = pkr for some r < rk, so hk was rejected by the algorithm. When the
algorithm changed rk from r to r + 1, it had already found hk to be the best remaining choice of
some other trader s, and it had assigned gs = hk. Therefore hs > gs (s).
Moreover, the stable allocation is unique. If g is assigned differently on any cycle that leads to
step A5, that cycle will be a coalition violating (2).
3. A constructive lemma. We have observed that the stable allocation will be found by a
first-come-first-served algorithm equivalent to uniform hashing, using at least one permutation π
to give priority to the traders. For example, in the introduction we considered a case where n = 3
and the stable allocation was 1 3 2. Any π in which trader 3 has priority over trader 1 will find this
allocation.
We can also consider permutations of the preference lists. Let σ = σ(1) . . . σ(n) be a permuta-
tion of {1, . . . , n}, and suppose that trader σ(k) uses list p′
σ(k) = pk. This will permute the locally
optimum allocations, and it may also change the stable allocation. For example, if σ is 2 1 3, so
that
p′2 = 213 ,
p′1 = 312 ,
p′3 = 231 ,
the stable allocation becomes g′2g
′
1g
′
3 = 213, because g
′
2 must be 2 and then g
′
3 must be 3. Allocating
goods in the order 2 1 3 was the worst of the locally stable alternatives when σ was the identity
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permutation 1 2 3, but it is best in the modified problem. Shuffling the preference lists corresponds
to shuffling the goods that the traders started with.
We are now ready to prove a key fact about stable allocation. Let us say that the prioriti-
zation π is consistent with the shuffling σ, with respect to preferences p = p1 . . . pn, if the locally
optimum allocation g1 . . . gn obtained by uniform hashing with priorities π is the stable allocation
g′
σ(1) . . . g
′
σ(n) when p
′
σ(k) = pk. For example, π(1)π(2)π(3) = 1 3 2 produces the locally optimum
21 3, so π is consistent with the shuffling σ(1)σ(2)σ(3) = 2 1 3 just considered.
Lemma. Let p be any sequence of preference lists. There is a one-to-one correspondence between
all permutations π of {1, . . . , n} and all permutations σ such that, if π corresponds to σ, the
prioritization π is consistent with the shuffling σ.
Proof. Given p and π, suppose uniform hashing with priorities π produces the locally optimum
allocation g1 . . . gn. Write the preference lists in rows, with each gk circled in its list pk. Delete all
elements to the right of gk.
We will construct a shuffling σ whose stable allocation agrees with g. The construction involves
two dynamically growing sets X and Y , whose significance will become clear momentarily. Initially
X ← ∅ and Y is the set of all k where gk = pk1 (i.e., all row numbers in which the circled element is
all by itself). Set m← 0; as the construction proceeds, we will have defined σ
(
π(1)
)
, . . . , σ
(
π(m)
)
as a permutation of {gpi(1), . . . , gpi(m)}, and we will have X ⊆ Y , π(m+ 1) ∈ Y \X.
Find the minimum k in m < k ≤ n such that either k = n or
(
π(k+1) ∈ Y \X and π(k+1) >
π(m + 1)
)
or π(k + 1) 6∈ Y . Define σ
(
π(j)
)
= gpi(j+1) for m < j < k and σ
(
π(k)
)
= gpi(m+1). If
k = n, the construction is complete. Otherwise, remove gpi(m+1), . . . , gpi(k) from all preference lists
where they aren’t circled. If π(k + 1) 6∈ Y , set X ← Y and let Y be the set of all rows whose first
elements are now circled. (Since π defines g by uniform hashing, π(k + 1) will be in the new Y .)
Set m← k and repeat the instructions of this paragraph.
A worked example will help clarify this construction. Let
π(1) . . . π(9) = 5 3 4 9 1 8 2 7 6 .
Table 1 shows a sequence of preference lists for n = 9 in which π defines the locally optimum
allocation indicated by circled elements. All elements to the right of the circled ones have been
erased, since they are irrelevant for our present purposes.
1: 3© 4: 1 5© 7: 5 3 8©
2: 4© 5: 9© 8: 9 7©
3: 1© 6: 6© 9: 2©
Table 1. Preference lists and their stable allocation
The stable allocation determined by these preference lists happens to coincide with the circled
elements in Table 1, so in this case the priorities π produce the stable allocation; but our con-
struction works for any π, whether or not its locally optimum allocation is stable. Initially m = 0,
X = ∅, and Y = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9}. According to the rules stated, we proceed to set k = 2, since
π(3) 6∈ Y . So we define σ(5) = g3 = 1 and σ(3) = 9; then we delete 1 and 9 from lists 4 and 8, and
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we set X ← {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9}, Y ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}, m← 2. Next, k = 5 since π(6) = 8 ∈ Y \X
and 8 > 4 = π(3). This time σ(4) = 2, σ(9) = 3, σ(1) = 5. We delete 2, 3, and 5 where they
are not circled. After setting m ← 5 we have k = 7, because π(8) 6∈ Y . (Notice that 7 6∈ Y , even
though row 7 now contains only its circled element. The construction changes Y only in the case
π(k + 1) 6∈ Y .) This time σ(8) = 4, σ(2) = 7, X ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}, Y ← {1, . . . , 9}, m ← 7.
On the final round we set σ(7) = 6 and σ(6) = 8; the shuffled preference lists are shown in Table 2.
It is easy to verify that their stable allocation matches that of Table 1, using the algorithm given
earlier.
5: 3© 2: 1 5© 6: 5 3 8©
7: 4© 1: 9© 4: 9 7©
9: 1© 8: 6© 3: 2©
Table 2. Shuffled precedence lists having the same stable allocation as Table 1.
The inverse construction is analogous. If σ is any shuffling, circle its stable allocation and
prepare an array like Table 2. Begin with m ← 0, X = ∅, and Y as before. Then repeatedly
consider all cycles
σ(a1)← σ(a2)← · · · ← σ(at)← σ(a1)
formed by elements {a1, . . . , at} ⊆ Y \ {π(1), . . . , π(m)}. Here σ(a) ← σ(b) means that σ(a) is
the (circled) element in list σ(b); for example, σ(4) ← σ(9) in Table 2 because the circled element
in list σ(9) = 3 is 2 = σ(4). The properties of stable allocation guarantee that at least one such
cycle exists, and our inverse construction will guarantee that each cycle will contain at least one
ai 6∈ X. Call the largest such ai the cycle leader, and renumber the subscripts so that a1 is the cycle
leader. Take the cycle with smallest leader, and set π(m + 1) ← a1, . . . , π(m + t) ← at. Remove
σ(a1), . . . , σ(at) from the tableau in places where they are not circled. Then set m ← m + t and
repeat the same process until all cycles have been recorded in π. Then set X ← Y and let Y be the
row numbers that now have but a single element. Repetition of these steps will produce a priority
permutation π consistent with σ.
It is not difficult to verify that these constructions invert each other. The reader will find
easily, for example, that the permutation σ(1) . . . σ(9) = 5 7 9 2 1 8 6 4 3 in Table 2 leads back to
π(1) . . . π(9) = 5 3 4 9 1 8 2 7 6.
4. A theorem. The lemma we have just proved makes it easy to establish the main result of this
note. We say that uniform hashing on p1 . . . pn with priorities π produces ranks r1 . . . rn if rpi(k) is
minimum such that
ppi(k)rpi(k) 6∈ {ppi(1)rpi(1) , . . . , ppi(k−1)rpi(k−1)}
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Theorem. When preference lists p1 . . . pn are independent and uniformly random, the probability
that the stable allocation g1 . . . gn = p1r1 . . . pnrn has a given value of the (unordered) multiset
{r1, . . . , rn} is the same as the probability that uniform hashing yields {r1, . . . , rn}.
Proof. Let {r1, . . . , rn} be any given multiset. If p = p1 . . . pn is any sequence of preferences and σ
is any permutation of {1, . . . , n}, let s(σ, p) = 1 if {r1, . . . , rn} is the multiset of ranks in the stable
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allocation when trader σ(k) has preference list pk; otherwise s(σ, p) = 0. Then the probability that
stable allocation on random preferences has ranks {r1, . . . , rn} is
1
n!n
∑
p
s(σ, p)
for any fixed σ.
Similarly, if π is any permutation of {1, . . . , n}, let h(π, p) = 1 iff {r1, . . . , rn} is the multiset of
ranks produced by uniform hashing with priorities π. Then the probability that uniform hashing
on random preferences has ranks {r1, . . . , rn} is
1
n!n
∑
p
h(π, p)
for any fixed π.
We want to show that these sums are equal. This is now obvious, because the lemma implies
that ∑
σ
∑
p
s(σ, p) =
∑
p
∑
σ
s(σ, p) =
∑
p
∑
pi
h(π, p) =
∑
pi
∑
p
h(π, p)
and we simply divide by n!n+1.
Notice that this proof of the theorem remains valid even when the preference lists p1 . . . pn are
not uniformly random. All we are assuming is a symmetry condition, that shuffled preference lists
pσ(1) . . . pσ(n) have the same distribution for all σ.
5. Corollaries. The analysis of uniform hashing is quite simple, so our theorem immediately
characterizes many properties of the ranks in random stable allocations. For example, let us find
the expected value of
(z + r1)(z + r2) . . . (z + rn) ;
this polynomial is clearly a function of the multiset {r1, . . . , rn}, so we can analyze it by considering
its behavior with respect to uniform hashing.
Let qkj be the probability that rk > j in uniform hashing. This is the probability that
pk1, . . . , pkj ∈ {p1r1 , . . . , p(k−1)rk−1}, so
qkj =
(
k − 1
n
)(
k − 2
n− 1
)
. . .
(
k − j
n− j + 1
)
=
(
k − 1
j
)/(
n
j
)
. (1)
Standard binomial coefficient summation techniques [3] show that
∞∑
j=0
(
j
m
)
qkj =
n+ 1
n+m+ 2− k
(
k − 1
m
)/(
n+m+ 1− k
m
)
. (2)
The expected value of (z + r1) . . . (z + rn) is therefore
∑
r1,...,rn
n∏
k=1
(
qk(rk−1) − qkrk
)
(z + rk)
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=n∏
k=1
∞∑
r=1
(
qk(r−1) − qkr
)
(z + r)
=
m∏
k=1

z +
∞∑
j=0
qkj


=
n∏
k=1
(
z +
n+ 1
n+ 2− k
)
=
1
(n+ 1)!
n+1∏
k=2
(kz + n+ 1) . (3)
In particular, the expected value of r1 + · · ·+ rn, which is the coefficient of z
n−1, is
n∑
k=1
n+ 1
n+ 2− k
= (n+ 1)(Hn+1 − 1) = (n+ 1)Hn − n . (4)
The other coefficients can be expressed in terms of Stirling cycle numbers if we note that
E(z + r1) . . . (z + rn)(z + n+ 1) =
1
(n+ 1)!
n+1∏
k=1
(kz + n+ 1) =
n+1∑
k=0
[
n+ 2
k + 1
]
(n+ 1)k
(n+ 1)!
zn+1−k . (5)
For example, the coefficient of zn−2 in E(z + r1) . . . (z + rn) is[
n+ 2
3
]
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)!
− (n+ 1)
[
n+ 2
2
]
(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)!
+ (n+ 1)2
[
n+ 2
1
]
1
(n+ 1)!
= (n + 1)2
(
1
2
(
H2n+1 −H
(2)
n+1
)
−Hn+1 + 1
)
=
(n+ 1)2
2
(
H2n −H
(2)
n
)
− n(n+ 1)(Hn − 1) ; (6)
see [3, exercise 6.33].
So far we have used only the case m = 0 of (2). A similar argument, using m = 1, shows that
E(z + r21) . . . (z + r
2
n) =
n∏
k=1
(
z +
(n+ 1)(n + 1 + k)
(n+ 2− k)(n + 3− k)
)
. (7)
In particular,
E(r21 + · · · r
2
n) =
n∑
k=1
(n+ 1)(n + 1 + k)
(n+ 2− k)(n+ 3− k)
= (n+ 1)
n∑
k=1
(
2n+ 4
(n+ 2− k)(n+ 3− k)
−
1
n+ 2− k
)
= (n+ 1)(n −Hn+1 + 1) = (n+ 1)(n −Hn) + n . (8)
Hence, by (6) and (8),
E
(
(r1 + · · ·+ rn)
2
)
= E(r21 + · · ·+ r
2
n) + 2 [z
n−2]E(z + r1) . . . (z + rn)
= (n+ 1)2
(
H2n −H
(2)
n
)
− (n+ 1)(2n + 1)Hn + n(3n+ 4) . (9)
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The expected value of the variance of the ranks is therefore
E
(
r21 + · · ·+ r
2
n
n
)
− E
((
r1 + · · ·+ rn
n
)2)
= n+O(log n)2 (10)
while the variance of the rank sum is
E
(
(r1 · · · + rn)
2
)
−
(
E(r1 + · · ·+ rn)
)2
= 2n(n+ 2)− (n+ 1)2H(2)n − (n+ 1)Hn
=
(
2−
π2
6
)
n2 +O(n log n) . (11)
The final rank rn in uniform hashing is uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , n}. Therefore the
probability is ≥ 12 that at least one trader in a random stable allocation will have rank ≥
1
2n. (He
will be left with a piece of goods he doesn’t like very much, since it’s in the lower half of his list.)
Indeed, the probability that max(r1, . . . , rn) ≤
1
2n is exactly
(1− q1m)(1 − q2m) . . . (1− qnm) ,
where m = ⌊1
2
n⌋; this is asymptotically
(1− 12 )(1−
1
4 )(1−
1
8 )(1 −
1
16 ) . . . ≈ .288788 . (12)
6. Conclusions and conjectures. The running time of the simple algorithm we have presented
for stable allocation is essentially proportional to the sum of ranks in the unique allocation, r1 +
· · ·+ rn. We have proved that the statistical properties of any symmetric function of (r1 . . . rn) are
identical to the corresponding statistics for uniform hashing, provided only that the distribution of
preference lists p1 . . . pn is invariant under shuffling. When the preferences are uniformly random,
the expected value of r1 + · · ·+ rn is exactly (n+ 1)Hn − n, and the standard deviation is O(n).
Uniform hashing is equivalent to the classical stable marriage problem when all the girls have
the same preference list. (See [6, pages 65–67].) Perhaps it is worthwhile to repeat here the main
research problem about stable marriages that was advertised in the author’s lectures of 1975 [6] and
not yet resolved: If the girls have any fixed set of preferences and the boys propose at random, is
the expected rank sum r1+ · · ·+ rn of the male-optimum stable marriage always ≥ (n+1)Hn−n?
In other words, does the case of equal preferences for the girls (uniform hashing) give the greatest
lower bound for E(r1 + · · ·+ r0)? If so, the average would be tightly bounded, because the upper
bound (n− 1)Hn + 1 is easy to prove [6, page 43].
In fact, computer experiments for small n suggest that the maximum value of E(r1+ · · ·+ rn),
when the girls have a fixed set of preferences and the boys propose independently at random, is
obtained if and only if the girls’ preferences are cyclic, in the sense that we could rename boys and
girls so that girl j’s kth choice is congruent to j + k (mod n).
Both conjectures about min and max E(r1 + · · · + rn) have been verified by exhaustive enu-
meration when n ≤ 4, and in several hundred random experiments when n = 5. Presumably there
is a (simple?) way to prove that, in some sense, the more the girls agree in their ranking, the less
the men will have to propose, on the average.
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Is there a simple expression for E(r1 + · · · + rn) when the girls’ preferences are cyclic? For
n = 3, 4, 5 the values are respectively 306/3!3 , 884224/4!4 , 104035560000/5!5 . When n = 4, the
worst seven preference matrices for the girls are
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2 3 4 1 2 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 1 2 3 4
3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 1 3 1 4 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 3 2 4 2 1 3 4 2 3 1
with respective total rank sums
884224, 879488, 875264, 875072, 874752, 874624, 872192.
All preference matrices not isomorphic to these seven, under renumbering of boys and girls, have
smaller total rank sum over all 4!4 preference matrices for the boys.
Acknowledgment. I want to thank Boris Pittel for introducing me to this problem and for
patiently correcting my original misunderstanding of the definitions.
References
[1] Alan M. Frieze and Boris G. Pittel, “Probabilistic analysis of an algorithm in the theory of
markets in indivisible goods,” Annals of Applied Probability 5 (1995), 768–808.
[2] D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, “College admissions and the stability of marriage,” American
Mathematical Monthly 69 (1962), 9–15.
[3] Ronald L. Graham, Donald E. Knuth, and Oren Patashnik, Concrete Mathematics (Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison–Wesley, 1989).
[4] Dan Gusfield and Robert W. Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1989).
[5] Donald E. Knuth, Sorting and Searching (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison–Wesley, 1973).
[6] Donald E. Knuth, Mariages Stables (Montre´al: Les Presses de l’Universite´ de Montre´al, 1976).
[7] D. G. McVitie and L. B. Wilson, “The stable marriage problem,” Communications of the ACM
14 (1971), 486–492.
[8] L. S. Shapley and H. Scarf, “On cores and indivisibility,” Journal of Mathematical Economics
1 (1974), 23–38.
9
